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 Abstract 
 In 1951 the Genocide Convention pledged to abolish all cruel and unfair forms of torture and 
death to innocent civilians for religious, national and ethnic reasons. 67 years after its ratiﬁ cation, 
we seem to be witnessing more international criminal trials for crimes against humanity than ever 
before. Th e recent alarming rise in such cases calls into question the morality and punishment of 
genocide. What impact does the Genocide Convention still have in today’s challenging interna-
tional climate? Is the crime of genocide simply too complex and too ‘evil’ to punish appropriately? 
Th is article provides an in-depth examination of the oﬀ ence of genocide, and an analysis of the 
jurisprudential issues relating to the punishment of genocide. Is it possible to punish genocide 
appropriately? 
 Keywords 
 1951 Genocide Convention; morality; punishment 
 1. Introduction 
 International criminal law has progressed in leaps and bounds over the last seven 
decades. Th e international community is no longer afraid to exert pressure on 
wayward rulers and their unethical customs. But in the midst of all the develop-
ments, the Genocide Convention remains obscure. Close examination of the 
1951 Convention reveals a surprisingly ambiguous oﬀ ence, regulatory in nature 
and almost impossible to fairly apply. Th e Courts and Tribunals which have juris-
diction over genocide have had to canvass the vague wording of the provisions for 
themselves. Th is lack of clarity leads to a frustrating reliance on the next available 
oﬀ ence: crimes against humanity. Th is dilemma not only releases the perpetrator 
from the moral stigma attached to genocide, but includes a risk of humanity 
crimes becoming the popular ‘catch-all category’ in international law. In the rare 
event that an oppressor’s behaviour does fall into the provisions of genocide, the 
mode of punishment (i.e., imprisonment) seems insigniﬁ cant compared to the 
horrors of the crime. Aside from regulatory issues, it becomes clear during  analysis 
 *) Th e author has an LLM in Criminal Law and Procedure and has published in criminal law. 
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that genocide is also an oﬀ ence based on morality. How do we punish a moral 
wrong? Genocidal acts continue to be committed despite the introduction of the 
Convention, 1 and recent case law has done very little to reinforce the grave nature 
of genocide or to close the regulatory loopholes that appear in the provisions. 
What are the theoretical approaches to punishment, and which ones are appli-
cable to genocide? 
 2. Th e Development of Genocide in International Criminal Law 
 ‘Genocide’ loosely signiﬁ es an act committed with the intent to destroy in whole 
or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Many deﬁ nitions of geno-
cide exist, including the following by  Chalk and  Jonassohn : “genocide is a form of 
one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a 
group.” 2 
 Th e word itself was thought up by Dr.  Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959) in his 
work  Axis Rule in Occupied Europe : ‘genocide’ comes from the ancient Greek 
word ‘genos’ (tribe, race) and the Latin term ‘cide’ (killing). 3 
 Th e idea that individuals can be personally liable for international crimes was 
slow to develop.  Lemkin proposed an oﬀ ence of barbarity in 1933. 4 Th is included 
acts of economic extermination and brutal attacks on the dignity of individuals 
causing damage to the collectivity to which they belonged. Lemkin’s ground-
breaking legislation proposed: 1) the punishment of acts aimed at destroying the 
life, bodily integrity, liberty, dignity and the economic existence of a racial, reli-
gious or social collectivity; 2) both instigators and accomplices to acts of barbarity 
carry the same punishment as the author; and 3) all perpetrators were to be pros-
ecuted and punished independently of the place where the act was committed. 
Th is was keeping in line with the principle  forum loci deprehensionis or ‘universal 
 1)  For example: the Korean war, the intertribal Burundi killings between the Tutsi and Hutu 
groups, the reported massacre of Ugandans during the rule of former President Idi Amin, the slay-
ing of dissidents in Equatorial Africa after independence was secured from Spain in 1968, the kill-
ing of Cambodians during the reign of Pol Pot, the mass killings of members of the Muslim 
minority in Chad in 1979, and the deaths of 180,000 Kurds in Northern Iraq as part of Saddam 
Hussein’s Anfal campaign in the 1980’s (he was hanged in December 2006 for his crimes against 
humanity). Th is, of course, does not include the most recent examples of President Robert Mugabe’s 
violent Zanu-PF party, and the capture and impending trial of Radovan Karadzic in July 2008 for 
his participation in the Bosnian Genocide. 
 2)   F. Chalk &  K. Jonassohn , (1990).  Th e History and Sociology of Genocide : Analyses and Case Studies . 
Yale University Press, at page 1. 
 3)  From  R. Lemkin , ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of  Government – 
Proposals for Redress.’ (1944), available from www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin. 
 4)   R. Lemkin , ‘Acts Constituting a General Transnational Danger Considered as Oﬀ ences Against 
the Law of Nations.’ (1933). Available from www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin. 
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repression’, based on the principle that an oﬀ ender can be brought to justice in 
the place where he is apprehended because he is regarded as an enemy of the 
whole international community. 5 Lemkin’s work was taken very seriously at the 
end of World War II. 
 Th e International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo were  ad hoc 
bodies set up to deal with the aftermath of the Second World War. Th e provisions 
of the Nuremberg Charter were aﬃ  rmed by the General Assembly in 1946 in 
Resolution 95(1). 6 Th e International Law Commission (ILC) formulated the fol-
lowing crimes under international criminal law: 
 Principle 6: 
 Th e crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international 
law: 
 a) crimes against peace; b) war crimes; c) crimes against humanity. 7 
 At this point, genocide was still embedded within ‘crimes against humanity’, but 
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(I) of 13 December 1946 
requested that the Economic and Social Council draft a convention. In December 
1948, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 8 Th e Convention came into force on 
January 12, 1951, and by 1985 there were 96 ratiﬁ cations. Th e Convention 
aﬃ  rms the criminality of genocide in time of peace as well as in time of war 
(Article 1), distinguishing it from war crimes into a category of its own. Article 2 
deﬁ nes the oﬀ ence: 
 Article 2: 
 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts com-
mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, as such: 
   a)  killing members of the group; 
   b)  causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 5)  Taken from Articles 1, 6 and 7 of Lemkin’s proposed legislation to the 5th Conference for the 
Uniﬁ cation of Penal Law, documented in Lemkin, R. (1933). Ibid. 
 6)  See: ‘Aﬃ  rmation of the Principles of International Law recognised by the Charter of the 
Nüremberg Tribunal’, Resolution 95 (I) of the United Nations General Assembly, 11 December 
1946. Available at www.icrc.org. 
 7)  Documented in the International Law Commission’s Report on ‘Principles of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’, Yearbook of the I.L.C., 1950, Vol. II, at page 195. 
 8)  78 UNTS 277 (1951). Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly 
on 9 December 1948: United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 78, at page 277. Available from http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/. 
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   c)  deliberately inﬂ icting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
   d)  imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
   e)  forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 Persons committing conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity to genocide 
are also punishable, whether they are constitutional rulers, public oﬃ  cials, or 
private individuals (Articles 3 and 4). Article 5 states that the parties to the 
Convention are under an obligation to enact the necessary domestic legislation to 
give eﬀ ect to the Convention and to provide eﬀ ective penalties. 9 Article 5 keeps 
in line with Lemkin’s  forum loci deprehensionis or ‘universal repression’ idea, which 
he describes as ‘the symbol and practical application of the higher doctrine of 
moral and legal solidarity’ in his 1947 work. 10 
 3. Th e Crime of Genocide in Detail 
 Because the Genocide Convention has been adopted into customary inter national 
criminal law, the Convention has its own  actus reus and  mens rea . International 
criminal responsibility is a diﬃ  cult concept. Can a State carry a legal intent? It 
seems appropriate to genocide to separate the culpable individuals from the State 
and then instigate international proceedings against the individuals. 11 A break-
down of genocide follows below, which allows us to identify the punishable ele-
ments of the oﬀ ence. 
 3.1. Th e Actus Reus of Genocide 
 Article 2 of the Convention clearly deﬁ nes the conduct that may amount to 
genocide:  
 a)  killing members of a national or ethical, racial or religious group; 
 b)  causing  serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 c)  deliberately inﬂ icting on the group  conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 d)  imposing  measures intended to prevent birth within the group; 
 e)  forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
  9) To take the United Kingdom as an example, see the Genocide Act 1969. 
 10)  Lemkin, R. ‘Genocide as a Crime under International Law’ (1947) A.J.I.L. Vol. 41(1): 
145-151. 
 11)  Suggested by Gardiner, R.K. (2003).  International Law . Pearson, Longman, at page 125. 
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 Akayesu 12 tightly deﬁ ned the above list: a) killing is ‘murder’; b) serious bodily and 
mental harm should not necessarily be permanent or irremediable; c) conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction include subjecting a group 
of people to a subsistence diet, 13 systematic expulsion from homes, and the reduc-
tion of essential medical services below minimum requirements; d) measures 
intended to prevent births within the group consist of sexual mutilation, steriliza-
tion, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages; 
e) forcibly transferring children can include physical and mental measures. 14 
 On ﬁ rst impressions this is an impressive and all-encompassing deﬁ nition: one 
can not imagine an individual instigating an oﬀ ence above and beyond those 
listed. But each case of genocide is individual to the perpetrator, making each act 
of genocide completely unique from all other acts of genocide. Fitting such dis-
tinctive fantasies into a general deﬁ nition is diﬃ  cult. 
 How are each of the four ‘groups’ (national, ethnical, racial, religious) under 
the Convention deﬁ ned? Th e ICTR and the ICTY have intervened on these 
points. In  Akayesu 15 the Trial Chamber of the ICTR set out a deﬁ nition of each 
group. ‘National groups’ are a collection of people who are perceived to share a 
legal bond of common citizenship coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties. 
An ‘ethnic group’ is a group whose members share a common language or cul-
ture, a ‘racial group’ is a group based on the hereditary physical traits often identi-
ﬁ ed with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or 
religious factors, and a ‘religious group’ is a group whose members share the same 
religion, denomination or mode of worship. Whilst this list appears to incorpo-
rate every conceivable type of group, it was thought by the ICTR that the groups 
protected against genocide should not be limited to the four groups envisaged in 
the provisions but should include ‘any stable and permanent group’. 16 Th is would 
be logical, as it would take into account both minority groups and the rather large 
category of ‘political’ groups which does not seem to have been considered. 
Professor  Cassese - who used to sit as a judge in the ICTY - remains unconvinced, 
and controversially believes that the framers of the Convention explicitly intended 
only the four groups mentioned to be protected. 17 Victims must be chosen 
 12)   Akayesu, ICTR, Trial Chamber I, Judgment of 2 September 1998, case no. ICTR-96-4-I. 
 13)  Argued to be a  ‘slow death’ by Akhavan, P. (2005) ‘Focusing on ICTR Case Law - Th e Crime of 
Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence’ I.C.J. 3 4 (989), at page 10. 
 14)   Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 12, at paras. 502-509. Lemkin considered the deliberate separation of 
families for depopulation purposes to be genocidal activity in his 1947 work: R. Lemkin (1947) 
loc. cit. at f.n. 10. 
 15)   Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 12. 
 16)  Ibid., at paras. 512-515. 
 17)  See  A. Cassese , (2003).  International Criminal Law . Oxford University Press, at page 101. In 
 Akayesu the Trial Chambers went to great lengths to characterise the Tutsi group as an ‘ethnic’ group 
in order to justify the label of genocide. In the end the Tutsi’s were labelled as an ‘ethnic’ group for 
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 by reason of their membership in the group whose destruction was sought. Th e 
current case law tells us that what matters is the intent to attack victims  on account 
of their ethnic, racial, or religious characteristics. Th is is, however, diﬃ  cult to 
prove and easy to deny. As a result of  Krstic and  Zoran Kupreskic it must currently 
be established that: (i) the victims were in fact treated as belonging to one of the 
protected groups; and (ii) they considered themselves as belonging to one of such 
groups. 18 Can we take from this that the test for ‘groups’ is both objective (the 
victim’s view) and subjective (the perpetrator’s view)? A further mixture of objec-
tivity and subjectivity appeared in  Kayishema and Ruzindana where ‘self-identiﬁ -
cation’ and ‘identiﬁ cation by others’ were considered to be key factors when 
identifying an ethnic group. 19  Rutaganda pushed the subjective standard even 
further by suggesting that for the purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, 
membership of a group is a completely subjective concept. 20 Th e ICTY Trial 
Chambers applied this strictly subjective approach in  Jelisic  21 and  Krstic. 22 
Akhavan strongly condemns this approach, claiming that whilst a constructivist 
approach to identity is appealing, this solely subjective test leads to a theoretical 
absurdity: a perpetrator could deﬁ ne virtually any group as ethnic, irrespective of 
its objective attributes, and be guilty of genocide. 23 Should not a fair and liberal 
criminal system take an objective view?  Rutaganda was quick to deﬁ ne its deﬁ ni-
tion of the subjective test, concluding that certain groups - such as political and 
economic groups - were excluded from the Convention deﬁ nition because of 
their ‘mobile’ status, suggesting that the Convention intended to cover relatively 
stable and permanent groups. 24 Th is is disappointing. Did the United Nations 
when drafting the Genocide Convention intend to turn a blind eye to political 
victims? Most mass killings take place during political upheavals. Th is would 
allow President Robert Mugabe to slip through a loophole in the Convention, as 
his Zanu-PF party no doubt acted on political motives. Adolf Hitler also har-
boured political reasons for exterminating over one million people. Would he be 
able to escape liability under the Genocide Convention too? 
the purposes of the 1951 Convention as the result of oﬃ  cial documents labelling them as such. For 
further discussion see  P. Akhavan , (2005) op. cit. at f.n. 13, at page 1. 
 18)  See in particular  Krstic, ICTY, Trial Chamber, decision of 2nd August 2001, case no. IT-98-
33-T, at para 561 and  Th e Prosecutor v  Zoran Kupreskic IT-95-16-T (14 Jan 2000) at para. 636. 
 19)   Kayishema and Ruzindana , ICTR, Trial Chamber II, judgment of 21 May 1999, case no. ICTR-
95-1-T, at para. 98. 
 20)   Rutaganda ICTR, Trial Chamber, judgment of 6 December 1999, case no. ICTR-96-3-T, at 
para. 56. 
 21)   Jelisic , ICTY Trial Chamber I, judgment of 14 December 1999, case no. IT-95-10-T, at paras. 
70-71. 
 22)   Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 18, at paras. 556 – 560. 
 23)  P. Akhavan, (2005) loc. cit. at f.n. 13, at page 8. 
 24)   Rutaganda, op. cit. at f.n. 20, at para. 56. 
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 ‘In whole or in part’ is a very vague element of the  actus reus of genocide. 
Th e ‘part’ of the group which is exterminated must represent a large number 
 relative to the whole size of the group and the destruction must target a qualita-
tively signiﬁ cant part of the group i.e. the elite part of the group. 25  Krstic held that 
the perpetrator must view the part of the group they wish to destroy as a distinct 
entity. 26 Geographic location will not indicate whether the targeted group is ‘sub-
stantial’, but it can, in combination with other factors, inform the analysis. 27 Th is 
all seems a little vague, but is likely to develop on an  ad hoc basis on individual 
merits. 
 3.2. Th e Mens Rea of Genocide 
 Th e  mens rea for genocide is provided very clearly in Article 2 of the Convention, 
which is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group.  Jorgic described the visions of such a perpetrator: “[they] do not 
see the victim as a human being, but only as a member of the persecuted 
group.” 28 
 Interestingly,  Shaw notes that States may deny genocide by claiming that the 
intent to destroy a group in whole or in part was in fact absent. 29 In such a sce-
nario,  Akayesu held that intention is almost impossible to determine, and so in 
the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a 
certain number of presumptions of fact. 30 What evidence would be required for 
this? Th e ICTY in  Krstic considered evidence relating to the cultural or social 
destruction of a group in relation to implying intention. Despite only physical 
and biological destruction of a group coming within the ambit of the Convention, 
the ICTY held that simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property 
and symbols of the targeted group may be considered as evidence of an intent to 
physically destroy the group. 31 Th is practice by the ICTY seems to be a long 
stretch to establish a  mens rea for genocide, as logically, the destruction of  religious 
symbols can simply mean just that. However, attacks on religious symbols may be 
coupled with physical or biological destruction, and these widespread symbolic 
 25)   Jelisic , op. cit . at f.n. 21, at para. 82. 
 26)   Krstic, op. cit . at f.n. 18, at paras. 590-597. 
 27)  Ibid. 
 28)   Jorgic , Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 30th April 1999, at para. 401. See 
also 12th December 2000 and the judgment of 26 September 1997 in 3 Strafrecht 215/98. On-line 
at www.bverf.de. 
 29)  M.N. Shaw, (2003). ‘International Law’ 5th Edition. Cambridge University Press, at page 263. 
 30)   Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 12, at para. 523. 
 31)   Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 18, at para. 580; and  Karadzic and Mladic , (Review of the Indictment 
pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) ICTY, Trial Chamber, decision of 11 
July 1996, case no. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, at para 94. 
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attacks may take a more evidential standpoint when coupled with witness accounts 
in future cases to aid the veriﬁ cation of the required  mens rea . 
 ‘Ethnic cleansing’ - where a certain group of people are ‘weeded out’ of the 
larger race - is not in itself provided for under Article 2 of the Genocide 
Convention, 32 and the ICTY has refused to label ethnic cleansing as genocide. 33 
 Vuckovic recently conﬁ rmed that ‘the forced expulsion of a population with an 
acceptance that a consequence may be death’ does not characterise the intent to 
destroy an ethnic group in whole or in part. 34 Is this is a wise decision? In similar 
cases, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been characterised as genocide. For example, Judge 
Riad in  Karadzic and Mladic held that ethnic cleansing can lead to new borders 
‘by violently changing the national or religious composition of the population, 
therefore presenting genocidal characteristics.’ 35 Could this rationale pave the 
way to a new oﬀ ence of cultural genocide in the future? In  Krstic , Bosnian Serb 
forces killed all military-aged men, thus eliminating all likelihood that they could 
ever re-establish themselves on that territory. Th e physical disappearance of 
the group did not amount to a ‘physical destruction’ of the group under the 
Convention, but the ICTY held that the group had been ‘destroyed’. 36 Did the 
Chamber ﬂ irt with the notion of cultural genocide by treating the combination 
of the massacres and their forcible transfer as the ‘destruction’ of the group? 37 It 
must be noted that Lemkin did not limit genocide to physical destruction but 
suggested many forms of genocide, including political, social, cultural, language, 
national feeling, religious, economic, personal security, liberty, health, and dig-
nity. If the Convention covered  all acts of murder motivated by discrimination, 
surely this would send a message to world leaders that their unlawful behaviour is 
in no uncertain terms to be categorised as genocide? 38 Either way, ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’ is currently only an act from which genocidal intent can be inferred. 
 32)  During drafting, Syria proposed a sixth class of acts of genocide: ‘imposing measures intended 
to oblige members of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat of subsequent 
ill-treatment’. Th is was rejected: UN Doc. A/C6/234. 
 33)   Krstic, op. cit . at f.n. 18, at para 580;  Jelisic , op. cit. at f.n. 21, at paras 78-83. However, Th e 
United Nations General Assembly has previously labelled ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide: 
UN Doc AG/Res./47/121 of 18 Dec 1992. 
 34)   Vuckovic , Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Supreme Court of Kosovo, decision of 31 August 
2001, AP.156/2001, at paras 2-3. See also  Kusljic , Germany, Federal Higher Court of Justice, judg-
ment of 21 February 2001, 3 StR 244/00, at paras. 7-10. 
 35)   Karadzic and Mladic (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the rules of Procedure 
and Evidence) ICTY, Trial Chamber, decision of 11 July 1996, case no. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18, 
at para. 94. 
 36)   Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 18, at paras. 590-597. 
 37)  For further discussion see Tournaye, C. (2003) ‘Shorter Articles, Comments, and Notes 
Genocidal Intent before the ICTY’ (2003) I.C.L.Q. 52 2 (447), at page 9. 
 38)  R. Lemkin, (1944) loc. cit. at f.n. 3. A more detailed list appeared later in R. Lemkin,  ‘Genocide - 
A Modern Crime’ (1945) Free World, Vol. 4. It has been submitted that Lemkin’s suggestions 
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 Whereas both genocide and crimes against humanity require the intent to 
commit the  actus reus , genocide also requires a special intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a particular group. Otherwise known as  dolus specialis, this is a unique 
mental element to genocide. 39 In addition, there can be no reckless genocide. 40 
 Dolus specialis applies to all acts of genocide under Article 2 of the Convention. 
Th is special intent requires the perpetrator to ‘clearly intend the result’, signifying 
‘a psychological nexus between the physical result and the mental state of the 
perpetrator’. 41 In  Jorgic , the  dolus specialis was deduced from the circumstances of 
an attack carried out through the structurally organized control of a group, of 
which the perpetrator was ‘aware’. 42 ‘Awareness’ appears to play an important part 
in establishing the  dolus specialis of genocide.  Akayesu may have confused this 
aggravated intent with recklessness, as the Trial Chamber held in that case that 
the oﬀ ender was culpable because he knew or  should have known that the act 
committed would destroy, in whole or in part, a group. 43 International criminal 
law must be careful not to include recklessness into the Genocide Convention 
deﬁ nition, as this would soften the evil element which distinguishes genocide 
from all other crimes. At the other end of the spectrum, a perhaps too lenient 
judgement can be found in  Jelisic, where the defendant could not be found guilty 
of genocide because he killed ‘arbitrarily’: it had not been proved beyond all rea-
sonable doubt that the accused was motivated by the  dolus specialis of the crime. 44 
 Jelisic can be accused of narrowing the law. If evidence is found that links the 
perpetrator’s intent to destroy a group to the actual destruction of that group, can 
it not then be assumed that the  dolus specialis is made out? What other evidence 
would be required short of a confession? Perhaps  Jorgic is a better alternative, 
where systematic expulsion can be an  indication of the required intent? 
 3.3. Punishing a Moral Wrong: Th eory 
 Looking back at Lemkin’s work before the Genocide Convention came into 
being, it becomes very clear that the oﬀ ence of genocide is based on morality. 
should be read with caution. Th is wide-ranging oﬀ ence could do more harm than good. For further 
criticism see C. Tournaye, ibid., at page 5. 
 39)   Kayishema, op. cit, at f.n. 19, at para. 91 states that this aggravated intention is unique to 
genocide. 
 40)  Th is is the ICTR’s interpretation from  Akayesu , op. cit. at f.n. 12, paras. 497, 544-7;  Kambanda 
(ICTR 97-23-S), Trial Chamber I, 4 September 1998, para. 16;  Kayishema and Ruzindana op. cit. 
at f.n. 19, para. 91;  Rutaganda op. cit. at f.n. 20, para. 59;  Musema , ICTR, Trial Chamber, judg-
ment of 27 January 2000, ICTR-96-13-T, para. 164. 
 41)   Musema, ibid . , at paras. 164 and 166. 
 42)  See  Jorgic , Germany, Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 30th April 1999, at paras. 
19-22. op. cit. at f.n. 75. 
 43)   Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 12, at para 520. 
 44)   Jelisic , op. cit. at f.n. 21, at paras. 107-108. 
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Lemkin believed that by violating the natural right of existence, genocide is not 
only a crime against the rules of war, but a crime against humanity. 45 He submit-
ted that the practice of genocide anywhere in the world curtails the vital interests 
of all civilised people: 
 “Minorities of one sort or another exist in all countries, and if persecution of any minority by 
any country is tolerated anywhere, then the very moral and legal foundations of constitutional 
government may be shaken.” 46 
 Morality strikes at the very heart of genocide, but punishing a moral wrong has 
jurisprudential diﬃ  culties. Genocide is considered to be a ‘peremptory norm’ or 
 ‘jus cogens’ , which is a fundamental legal obligation owed by States to all others 
( erga omnes ). 47  Gardiner asserts that  jus cogens are rules that are ‘blindingly obvi-
ous’ and are ‘clearly a part of international law’. 48 A good example of the nature 
of  jus cogens is provided in the  Nicaragua case, 49 which described the prohibition 
of the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United 
Nations to be:
 “A ‘universal norm’, a ‘universal international law’, a ‘universally recognized principle of inter-
national law’, and a ‘principle of jus cogens’.” 50 
 Considering the moral signiﬁ cance of the individual when making political 
assessments is one of the main features of liberalism, endorsed by  Dworkin , 51 
 Rawls , 52 and  Nozick . 53 Th is approach allows civilians to be taken seriously as moral 
agents worthy of respect and appears in many diﬀ erent guises:  Dworkin wrote of 
equal respect and concern, 54  Hart wrote of a principle of fairness, 55 and the 
 45)  See  R. Lemkin ,  ‘American Scholar’ (1946) Vol. 15, No. 2, at pages 227–230. 
 46)   R. Lemkin , (1945)  loc. cit. at f.n. 38. Even the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
96(I) of 13 December 1946 claimed that genocide ‘shocked the conscious of mankind, resulted in 
great losses to humanity and was contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United 
Nations’. See Resolution 96(I): ‘Th e Crime of Genocide’ available at www.un.org/documents. 
 47)  ‘Th e rights and obligations enshrined in the [genocide] convention are rights and obligations 
erga omnes …’  Bosnia and Herzegovina v  Yugoslavia [1993] ICJ Rep. 407, at para. 616. On 26 
February 2007 this case was updated on http://www.icj-cij.org. 
 48)  See R.K. Gardiner, op. cit. at f.n. 11, at p. 124. 
 49)   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v  United States of 
America) [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14. 
 50)  Ibid., at para. 190. 
 51)  R. Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’, in  S. Hampshire (ed.),  Public and Private Morality, Cambridge 
University Press, 1978;  Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1977; and  Law’s Empire, 
London, Fontana, 1986. 
 52)   J. Rawls ,  A Th eory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1971. 
 53)   R. Nozick ,  Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974. 
 54)  R. Dworkin, op. cit. f.n. 51, at pps. 180-3 and 272-8. 
 55)   H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility , Oxford University Press, 1968, at pps. 11-13 and 
21-4. 
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utilitarian theory believes that each person should count for one and no more 
than one. 56 
 Utilitarianism is concerned with the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
of people. Th e threat of punishment is believed to have a deterrent eﬀ ect on 
potential oﬀ enders, and the negative eﬀ ect of punishment is outweighed by the 
saving of pain and increased happiness amongst the secure public. 57 In direct 
contrast to utilitarianism, it is also thought that there is a need to inﬂ ict an 
unpleasant punishment upon a culpable oﬀ ender for the simple reason that they 
‘deserve it’. Th is is the classical retributivist view, typically found in the guise of 
the ‘desert principle’ in the work of  Kant . 58 Th is school of thought dates back to 
the  lex talionis : an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, etc, except the retributivist 
view also takes into account the knowledge and capacity of the defendant to con-
trol his or her actions: the oﬀ ender must be culpable, and not simply an innocent 
man in the wrong place at the wrong time or sacriﬁ ced for the ‘greater good’. 
Both deterrence theorists and retributivists believe that it is morally just to inﬂ ict 
punishment upon oﬀ enders. What separates the two positions is how they go 
about justifying the punishment. 
 3.3.1. Utilitarianism, Deterrence and Genocide 
 A common criticism directed towards the utilitarian approach to punishment is 
that individuals are treated as ‘a means to an ends’ as opposed to ‘ends in them-
selves’ 59 and are sacriﬁ ced merely to achieve a general social goal with no consid-
eration as to the eﬀ ect of the punishment on the incapacitated individual: 
 “Th is cost/beneﬁ t approach to the justiﬁ cation of punishment is at the same time the theory’s 
greatest strength and its greatest weakness. It is the former because it is such an eminently 
sensible and intuitively compelling rationale. We punish in order to keep the levels of crime to 
a reasonable minimum. It is as simple as that. It is the latter, a great weakness, for on these 
terms the duty or right to punish an oﬀ ender is straightforwardly contingent on how much 
good the punishment will do. It is easy to conjure up hypothetical cases in which deterrence 
theory would require punishing the innocent, excessively, punishing.” 60 
 What does this mean in relation to genocide? Will an innocent man be slain as an 
example to others? Will the perpetrator himself be punished as a warning from 
 56)   J. Bentham ,  Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation ,  J. Burns and  H.L.A. Hart , 
(eds.), London, Methuen, 1982, at pps. 11-16 and 38-41. 
 57)   J. Bentham ,  op. cit. f.n. 56, at pps. 70, 145, 165, 166, 186, and chapter 13 generally. Th ese 
arguments match Durkheim’s idea that one function of the criminal law is to reinforce the collective 
moral consciousness of the society. See  E. Durkheim ,  Th e Division of Labour in Society , 1893, 
Glencoe, Free Press, 1960, vol. 1, see chapter 2. 
 58)  See in particular the book:  I. Kant ,  Th e Philosophy of Law, transl. W. Hastie, Edinburgh, 1887. 
 59)  See particularly N. Lacey,  State punishment: Political Principles and Community Values, Routledge, 
1988, at p. 29. 
 60)   Barron et al .,  Jurisprudence and Legal Th eory, Oxford University Press, 2002, at p. 541. 
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the state? Or, will the ‘greater good’ he was trying to achieve be recognised and 
will he be free to go? Sprigge applies the utilitarian theory directly to a scenario 
of war: 
 “… it is within the bounds of possibility that a commander whose chances of victory demanded 
some sort of co-operation from the local people, and who had good reason to believe that 
without this victory the common good of humanity would suﬀ er, ﬁ nding this method of 
securing the population’s co-operation the only workable one, would rightly consider that it 
was justiﬁ ed. If the circumstances really were as described most people who condone war at all 
would probably think the act was right.” 61 
 Th e outcome of this argument is disturbing. Most genocidal leaders indeed have 
a political or religious justiﬁ cation for their acts. Hitler believed that the extermi-
nation of the Jewish population would allow the larger Arian race to ﬂ ourish. 
Oﬀ enders could argue: “the best interests of the majority were at heart … it was 
a decision taken for the good of the people.” Could the application of the utili-
tarianism theory of punishment to the act of genocide eﬀ ectively abolish the 
crime of genocide? 
 3.3.2. Retributivism and Genocide 
 Genocide is a crime against morality. Described as the ‘crime of crimes’ by 
 Kambanda, 62 a feeling of ‘just deserts’ usually springs to mind when one thinks of 
punishing genocide. Would it be appropriate to save from punishment the state 
leader who abused his power to kill many innocent civilians?  Kant makes himself 
very clear: it is a matter of justice that the oﬀ ender must be punished:
 “… the right to pardon a criminal … is certainly the most slippery of all the rights of the 
sovereign. With respect to a crime of one subject against another, he absolutely cannot exer-
cise this right, for in such cases exemption from punishment constitutes the greatest injustice 
toward his subjects. If legal justice perishes, then it is no longer worthwhile for men to remain 
alive on this earth.” 63 
 If international criminal law was to take the retributivist view when punishing 
genocide, two questions would inevitably arise: 1) how is the unit of punishment 
to be measured; and 2) what is the justiﬁ cation for the punishment? Why hang 
or shoot an oﬀ ender because he made orders to kill one million people? Why not 
community service, or a ﬁ ne, or freedom? Th e challenge facing retribution is that 
it can be labelled as nothing more than revenge: an irrational and emotional 
 61)   T.L.S. Sprigge , ‘A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey’ 8 Inquiry 264-91, (1965) at pp. 274-84. 
 62)   Kambanda, (ICTR 97-23-S), Trial Chamber I, 4 September 1998, at para. 16. 
 63)   I. Kant ,  Th e Metaphysical Elements of Justice (1965) (translated by J. Ladd) London, Collier 
Macmillan, taken from  Barron , op. cit. f.n. 60, at page 564. 
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 display of hurt feelings through the inﬂ iction of violence upon the oﬀ ender. 
Other retributivist writers believe it is about justice and re-payment:
 “… punishment must be related to the gravity of the wrong because it must signify nothing 
but the recoiling of the criminal’s own act against itself. To ﬁ x penalties according to the 
requirements of deterrence or correction is to degrade him to an object or tool; were a ﬁ ne the 
penalty for murder, we would feel that murder had not been suﬃ  ciently repaid.” 64 
 Th is is an interesting argument, but how are crimes against humanity ‘repaid’? 
Let us assume that Hitler was captured after the Second World War. Could we 
have simply taken all his luxuries and power away from him in order to punish 
him, or could we have allowed the surviving relatives of the genocide victims to 
kill him and each take a piece of his body to replace their missing relative in order 
to ‘repay’ his crime? What is the unit of measurement? 
 McCloskey was part of the retributivist revival in the 1960’s. His views on 
retributivism are very illustrative of some the challenges facing the desert 
theory: 
 “Punishment, to be justly administered, must involve care in determining whether the oﬀ end-
ing person  is really a responsible agent . Th e punishment must not exceed what is appropriate to 
the crime. A general principle of justice [is] that equals should be treated equally  and unequal’s 
unequally .  Unequal treatment amounts to deliberate inﬂ iction of evils : suﬀ ering or death. 
Production of the greatest good is obviously a relevant consideration when determining  which 
punishment may properly be inﬂ icted, but the question as to which punishment is  just is a 
much more basic and important consideration. Th e fact that we reach diﬀ erent conclusions 
about the relative gravity of diﬀ erent crimes constitutes no diﬃ  culty for the retributive theory. 
Most of us would agree that murder is a very serious crime and that shoplifting a cake of soap 
is a considerably lesser oﬀ ence.” 65 
 McCloskey makes some interesting - if not rather ambiguous - arguments about 
justice. He states that ‘unequals’ must be treated ‘unequally’ and this would lead 
to justice. What makes an oﬀ ender ‘unequal’? Are there varying degrees of 
unequalness? How is this measured? Some oﬀ ences present simple solutions for 
retributivists: a rapist could be raped, a murderer could be shot, etc. But if a mur-
derer kills one person and receives the ‘just’ penalty of death, what would a leader 
who kills many people receive? Th e same sentence? Would he receive an addi-
tional torturing? Does this not make his punishment unequal to his crime? 
 When it comes to punishment, retributivists can not provide a clear answer to 
the question of measurement. Indistinctly, McCloskey states that if we all agree 
 64)  A. Brudner, ‘Retribution and the Death Penalty’ 30  University of Toronto Law Journal , 337-355, 
1980, at p. 350. 
 65)  All emphasis my own. See  H.J. McCloskey , ‘A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment’ 
8 Inquiry 249, 1965, at p. 263. 
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that murder is wrong, we can therefore adequately measure which punishments 
match other oﬀ ences. In practice, we see this in our court systems today. Parking 
oﬀ ences are met with ﬁ nes, murders are met with mandatory life sentences. But 
judges are allowed to take into account defenses and personal circumstances. 
Retribution allows for no such thing. If Saddam Hussein was clinically insane 
and committed genocide in a cloud of confusion, would he have still been 
hanged? 
 McCloskey states that ‘unequal treatment amounts to deliberate inﬂ iction of 
evils’. Why does unequal treatment automatically equate to suﬀ ering or death? 
What if the oﬀ ence was non-violent, such as adultery? Or an oﬀ ence with no 
victim, such as money laundering? Brudner adds a welcome theory of propor-
tionality to retributivism, but he also removes the consideration of  mens rea when 
punishing. Th is is controversial - moving away from the retributivist view of cul-
pability - and may make a considerable diﬀ erence to the proportion of punish-
ment inﬂ icted: 
 “Th e commensurability of crimes and punishments would be destroyed as soon as we added 
considerations of  mens rea to the balance. Th e measure of punishment is properly derived not 
from the qualitative or quantitative aspects of the crime (as in revenge) but from its moral 
signiﬁ cance.” 66 
 Brudner prefers to look at the moral signiﬁ cance of an oﬀ ence rather than the 
characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime. 
Could this be applied eﬀ ectively to genocide? Would it have mattered to the 
Kurdish survivors whether Saddam Hussein was insane or not? Brudner’s com-
ments present one signiﬁ cant discrepancy. By removing the consideration of  mens 
rea when deciding punishment, the elements of wickedness and culpability are 
also removed from consideration. Th ese are the very elements that make an 
oﬀ ence ‘morally wrong’. Let us say that an epileptic man begins to take a seizure 
in the street, and kicks a small child to within an inch of her life. He has no 
intent. He has no wickedness. How is this man’s action  morally wrong if he did 
not ‘act’ in the relevant sense? Let us now take a man who repeatedly kicks a small 
child with the intention to kill that child. He carries a vicious and dangerous 
intent which is dangerous to society. Th is man is more  deserving of punishment. 
It is in society’s moral interests to punish a dangerous man as opposed to an epi-
leptic man. Brudner’s version of retributivism does not take into account the 
intent or the rationale behind the defendant’s actions, which may, in today’s legal 
systems, equate to a defense. Th e only consideration upon which to decide what 
would amount to a ‘just’ punishment appears to be the resulting harm from 
the victim’s point of view. Could this approach illustrate more clearly the ‘moral 
 66)  A. Brudner, op. cit. f.n. 64, at p. 350. 
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signiﬁ cance’ of the oﬀ ence? If we were to punish oﬀ ences from the victim’s point 
of view, the punishment could potentially be much more severe than that of an 
oﬀ ender who had an excuse or a defense taken into account (i.e. duress). 
Additionally, how would such punishments be measured and applied by the court 
system? Th e punishment of genocide - from the view of a retributivist such as 
Brudner - would certainly be death. Although this may seem ‘just’ in the eyes of 
the surviving relatives of the victims, there is a concern when applying the retrib-
utivist theory that by putting to death the oﬀ ender, without acknowledging 
the oﬀ ender’s motives or state of mind, the state is as bad as the oﬀ ender himself. 
Is there a compromise? 
 3.3.3. Combined Th eories to Punish Genocide 
 Whilst retributivism is more appropriate to punish genocide than utilitarianism, 
one cannot help but feel that retributivism is merely a revenge tactic with no logic, 
no rational thought, and no deterrent message. Hart famously presented a com-
promise theory. 67 He believed that the general aim of punishment concerned gen-
eral deterrence and social protection - the cornerstones of utilitarianism. However, 
when considering who may be punished, he limited the options, using the retrib-
utivist principle of fairness and distribution, to the culpable oﬀ ender, placing a 
heavy emphasis on the oﬀ ender’s voluntary conduct and blameworthiness. 68 Th is 
theory appears, at ﬁ rst glance, to ﬁ t quite well to genocide. One of the main rea-
sons behind the Nuremberg Trials was to send a message to future generations that 
such atrocities should never be allowed to happen again, yet it was also satisfying 
to know that Auschwitz Commandant Rudolf Hoess was hanged on the grounds 
of Auschwitz where he had killed so many innocent people. Is it possible that the 
combined theory suggested by Hart could apply to the punishment of genocide? 
On the one hand, we would punish to deter, but on the other hand, we would 
limit the pursuit of the utilitarian goal by only punishing the culpable individual. 
But what of leaders like Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein, who merely gave 
orders to kill as opposed to shooting or gassing civilians themselves? Were they less 
culpable under Hart’s theory than the servants who carried out the commands? 
 Perhaps it is best to think of punishment as a combination of deterrence and 
deﬁ ance when it comes to genocide. Th e message from the international com-
munity appears to be: “we will not tolerate such behaviour, and if it occurs, the 
culpable party will be called to account.” 
 67)   H.L.A. Hart ,  op. cit. f.n. 55, at pages 5-6. 
 68)  Th is idea is similar to that of Rawls, who argued that the justiﬁ cation for the institution of 
punishment was a utilitarian one, but within the institution, individual punishments were justiﬁ ed 
on an essentially retributive basis. See  J. Rawls , ‘Two Concepts of Rules’,  Philosophical Review , vol. 
64, 1955, at page 3; and  A.H. Goldman , ‘Th e Paradox of Punishment’,  Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs , 
Vol. 9, 1979, at page 42. 
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 4. Punishing a Moral Wrong: Sanctions 
 As a result of the mass killings in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990’s, two 
International Criminal Tribunals were established by the UN Security Council 
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Th e Statutes of the International Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 69 and the International Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) 70 have both provided for the prosecution of individuals accused of geno-
cide despite their limited jurisdiction.  Akayesu 71 was hailed by UN Secretary-
General Koﬁ  Annan as: 
 “A landmark decision in the history of international criminal law that brings to life for the ﬁ rst 
time the ideals of the Genocide Convention adopted over 50 years ago.” 72 
 Two days later the decision in  Kambanda crowned genocide as the ‘crime of 
crimes’. 73 Th ese were followed by  Kayishema and Ruzindana 74 in the ICTR and 
 Jelisic 75 and  Krstic  76 in the ICTY. 
 What is interesting about the punishment of genocide is that even though 
many States are expected to indict this ‘crime of crimes’, they will sanction geno-
cide diﬀ erently. Th e death penalty seems to be the natural response to a genocide 
conviction as it is the ‘worst’ and most ‘ﬁ nal’ punishment. Saddam Hussain was 
hanged after his trial in December 2006, and ten of the defendants sentenced to 
death during the Nuremberg Trials in 1949 were also hanged (considered not 
worthy to face a ﬁ ring squad), but most genocide cases in recent times have 
ended in either imprisonment or appeals. In Rwanda, the death penalty was 
outlawed in 2007, and only then were the perpetrators of the Tutsi and Hutu 
 69)  ‘Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991’ (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - ICTY). Genocide is found at Article 
4. Adopted by Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) on 25 May 1993. See Annex to the Report 
of the Secretary-General pursuant to s. 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN doc. 
S/25704, 3 May 1993. Available at www.ohchr.org/english/law/. 
 70)  ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide’ (ICTR). Genocide is found 
at Article 2. See Annex to UN Security Council Resolution (1994) 955, 8 November 1994. 
Available at www.ohchr.org/english/law/. 
 71)   Akayesu, op. cit. at f.n. 12. 
 72)  UN Information Centre (Pretoria), Statement by U.N. Secretary-General Koﬁ  Annan on the 
Occasion of the Announcement of the First Judgement in a Case of Genocide by the International 
Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda. UN Doc. PR/10/98/UNIC, 1998. 
 73)   Kambanda, op. cit. at f.n. 62, at para. 16. 
 74)   Kayishema and Ruzindana, op. cit . at f.n. 19, at paras. 41-49. 
 75)   Jelisic , op. cit. at f.n. 21, at paras. 78-83. 
 76)   Krstic, op. cit. at f.n. 18, at paras. 539–569. 
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genocides  extradited to Rwanda for prosecution. Th is is interesting. Th e interna-
tional community prefer not to allow perpetrators to be extradited to a State 
which uses the death penalty and torture, despite the nature of the indictment. 
Is the international community showing a new sense of maturity, or are they 
leaving behind a more retributivist view? In  Kayishema and Ruzindana the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber remarked that  all of the crimes under the ICTR Statute are 
serious violations of international humanitarian law capable of attracting the 
same sentence, and genocide - as the ‘crime of crimes’ - does not impact on the 
sentence imposed. 77 Th is is disappointing.  Akhavan ﬁ nds this diﬃ  cult to accept, 
submitting that it is inappropriate to apply a ‘general appreciation’ to ‘the 
pinnacle of evil’. 78 Even  Lemkin saw the evil of genocide as an aggravating factor 
for punishment: 
 “… criminal intent to kill or destroy all the members of such a group shows premeditation and 
deliberation and a state of systematic criminality which is only an aggravated circumstance for 
punishment.” 79 
 In real terms, is the international community sending out a message to leaders 
that genocide is no longer as morally culpable as it once was? Several signatories 
to the 1951 Convention - namely Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, the United States, Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia - 
signed with the proviso that no claim of genocide could be brought against them 
at the International Court of Justice without their consent. Th is caused consider-
able controversy. Perhaps the notion of  jus cogens is not so far-reaching after all? It 
seems unlikely in the future that the international community will suddenly 
become ‘tougher’ on genocide; every day the horrors of the holocaust become 
more distant in our memory. Th ere does not seem to be the same urgency - the 
same conviction - to punish this ‘crime of crimes’ as there used to be. 
 If one looks closely, criminal proceedings are still happening. Genocide is 
unlikely to stay out of the news in the foreseeable future, and this is evidence that 
the Genocide Convention is still having an impact. Radovan Karadzic is now 
awaiting trial for his part in the Bosnian genocide, and on July 14, 2008, prosecu-
tors at the International Criminal Court (ICC) ﬁ led ten charges of war crimes 
against Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir in relation to the Sudan genocide. Th ese 
developments are positive; it sends a message to the international community 
that individuals will still be called upon to defend their genocidal behaviour in 
front of a judge and jury, no matter how highly-regarded they are. 
 77)  Judgement,  Kayishema, op. cit. at f.n. 19, at para. 367. 
 78)   P. Akhavan , (2005) op. cit. f.n. 13, at page 6. 
 79)   R. Lemkin , (1946)  loc . cit. at f.n. 45. 
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 80)  www.genocidewatch.org 
 5. Conclusion 
 In 1996,  Gregory Stanton , the president of Genocide Watch, 80 presented a brieﬁ ng 
paper called ‘Th e 8 Stages of Genocide’ to the United States Department of State. 
In it, he identiﬁ ed eight stages of behaviour characteristic of leaders who set out 
to exterminate a group of people. 1) Classiﬁ cation: people are divided into ‘us 
and them’; 2) Symbolization: symbols can be combined with hatred and forced 
upon a group i.e. hate speech; 3) Dehumanisation: one group denies the human-
ity of the other group and members of it are equated with animals and vermin; 
4) Organisation: special units of armies or militia are trained and armed; 
5) Polarisation: hate groups broadcast polarising propaganda; 6) Preparation: vic-
tims are identiﬁ ed and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity; 
7) Extermination: it is ‘extermination’ to the killers because they do not believe 
their victims to be human; 8) Denial: the perpetrators deny they committed any 
crime. Can it be argued that genocide may only be identiﬁ able when the physical 
eﬀ ects of the crime (i.e. missing groups of people) begin to show? Th ere have been 
times, particularly as a result of the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, where 
the response to genocide has been re-active rather than pro-active. By the time 
targeted ethnic or religious groups are separated, or broadcasts appear from hate-
groups, or armies are trained and equipped, the intent to commit genocide on the 
part of the perpetrator has probably been rooted, manifesting, and practiced in 
private for some time. In May 2008, President Robert Mugabe was faced with 
worldwide criticism when it emerged that the members of his Zanu-PF party 
tortured and killed civilians because they wanted to bring to an end their eco-
nomic crisis and supported the opposition party. No State took action despite the 
strong evidence ﬁ ltering out of the country through the international press. 
Whilst Gregory Stanton’s work does ring true - victims of genocide are visibly 
persecuted before extermination begins - the international community clearly 
will not take action until the bitter end. Additionally, political groups are not part 
of the 1951 Convention. Is President Robert Mugabe ‘free to go’? 
 Most people saw the trial of Saddam Hussein and his deﬁ ance against the 
judge and the Court which tried him. Did it feel as though he was being pun-
ished for the deaths of many? On the face of it, he received the same treatment, 
the same trial, and the same penalty as what the next man would have received 
for the death of one victim. It may be diﬃ  cult for retributivists, and the surviving 
families of genocide victims, to accept that we can not oﬀ er a greater punishment 
for the crime of genocide than we can for the killing of one man. Th is was reﬂ ected 
most recently in Rwanda when the trials for the Tutsi and Hutu genocide oﬀ end-
ers ﬁ nally began because Rwanda outlawed the death penalty. However, the 
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
0000895906.INDD   318 2/19/2009   11:58:01 AM
 L. Cherkassky / International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009) 301–319 319
 international community are still willing to punish the oﬀ ence of genocide and 
the culpable perpetrators behind genocidal acts, and the Courts are still sending 
out a message that the oﬀ ence will not be tolerated. Th e only diﬀ erence today, as 
opposed to Nuremberg sixty years ago, is that we do not want to punish the 
oﬀ enders in the same way that the oﬀ enders punished their victims. 
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